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Shanghai-born Yao Ming, a retired star player with the American National Basketball 
Association, is the celebrity face of translocal conservation campaigns to stop the 
consumption of shark-fin soup in Chinese restaurants worldwide. The standard justification 
for such communication practices is that they will generate media publicity and save shark 
populations, by encouraging increasingly affluent Chinese consumers to stop eating a luxury 
food item based on cruel and unsustainable practices. To date, there has been limited 
research on the nature of shark-protection campaigns in mainland China, the proclaimed 
major future market for shark fin. This paper fills that gap. It contends that these campaigns 
have missed their target, being heavily influenced by communication strategies used in 
international campaigns and providing incoherent local framing. Declining demand for 
shark fin demonstrates instead that government austerity measures have had a greater impact 
on luxury consumption practices, inadvertently highlighting the potential of “authoritarian 
environmentalism”. 
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Shark-fin soup is a luxury food item consumed in contemporary societies largely by 
ethnically Chinese people at banquets marking momentous occasions, such as Chinese New 
Year and weddings, and government and corporate events. Shark fin became an established 
ingredient in Chinese haute cuisine during the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644). Traditionally, 
shark-fin soup was served as a tribute to the emperor, the proclaimed ruler of all under 
heaven. It honoured the emperor because of the risk and expense involved in catching a 
“fierce” wild animal, and the belief that some of the animal’s vitality would be conferred on 
those who ate its fins (Clarke, Milner-Gulland, & Cemare, 2007, p. 307; Fabinyi, 2011, p. 
88). Today, serving shark-fin soup honours the host and their guests, both by confirming the 
wealth or status of the host and intimating that the guests are respected by the persons or 
organizations paying for the banquet. Eating shark-fin soup is a social event. 
 
International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) concerned with marine conservation, 
for example, WildAid, contend that shark-fin consumption is based on cruel and 
unsustainable fishing practices. The San Francisco-based NGO claims that “fins from up to 
73 million sharks” are used every year for shark-fin soup (Sharks, n.d.). Some of these sharks 
are finned alive and then thrown back into the ocean to drown or bleed to death, because the 
fins have more commercial value than the rest of the shark. China’s growing prosperity 
means that an increasing number of people can now afford to serve a “once rare and 
expensive delicacy” (Sharks, n.d.). This increasing consumption threatens to make one-third 
of open-ocean shark populations extinct, destroying a 400-million-year-long balance of ocean 
marine life. Yet shark fin reportedly has little flavour or nutritional and medicinal value, and 
eating shark fin may be unhealthy as shark fins contain high concentrations of mercury and 
other toxins (Sharks, n.d.). Using the now standard marketing practices of international 
NGOs (Brockington, 2009; Hassid & Jeffreys, 2015), WildAid has enlisted celebrity 
ambassadors – including basketball player Yao Ming – to generate spectacular media 
publicity for its Shark Conservation Program. 
 
WildAid’s shark conservation program is a translocal activist strategy aiming to connect and 
influence people in different locations at the same time through the exchange of celebrity-
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endorsed information, ideas and identities. The program’s core conservation message – 
“when the buying stops, the killing can too” – is directed at multiple locations and audiences 
around the world through multilingual broadcast, print and social media. The celebrities that 
deliver this message have international, national and local appeal. The rollout of specific 
campaigns mobilizes diverse networks of actors to transform both individual behaviours and 
government practice, by attempting to stop shark-fin consumption and obtain support for 
anti-shark finning legislation. The program also elicits different forms of sociability and 
community activity. Some of these are intended, such as expressions of cosmopolitan 
environmental awareness displayed through refusal to eat shark-fin dishes, participation in 
public education activities, and activism for legislative change. Others are neither intended 
nor desirable, such as vituperative claims to the effect that “all Chinese go out of their way to 
eat endangered species because of superstitious health beliefs” and “all anti-shark finning 
activists are racist China bashers” (Watson, 2005; see also comments on Chan, 2013; 
Reynolds, 2013). 
 
As a translocal activist strategy, WildAid’s shark conservation program demonstrates George 
Lakoff’s claim that successful communication about new conceptions of and action on the 
environment requires “coherent framing”. Lakoff (2010) argues that human beings do not 
perceive the meaning of “facts” directly; we think via typically unconscious (but socially 
variable) interpretive contexts which he calls “frames”. It is not the case that: “if you just tell 
people the facts, they will reason to the right conclusion” (Lakoff, 2010, pp. 72–3). Facts 
“will be ignored”, unless they make sense in terms of culturally-embedded systems of frames, 
which include sociological roles, locales, etiquette, general modes of understanding, values, 
emotional patterns, and so on (Lakoff, 2010, pp. 72–3, 71 & 77). To be communicated 
successfully, “the facts” must be framed persuasively and coherently, without activating 
opposing frames, and associated counter-arguments and conventional habits (Lakoff, 2010, 
pp. 72 & 79). Persuasive framing could entail: using an exemplary messenger; appropriate 
visuals; narratives that link the frames and the message; framing issues in morally acceptable 
terms; and never repeating the opposing arguments (Lakoff, 2010, pp. 79–80). 
 
This paper explores the relevance of Lakoff’s conception of “coherent framing” for translocal 
environmental communication by examining the rollout and reception of shark-protection 
campaigns in mainland China. It first details the celebrity-endorsed campaign promoted in 
mainland China by the international NGO WildAid. It then examines the shark-protection 
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efforts of business elites associated with the China Entrepreneur’s Club. Finally, it explores 
why these activist efforts are superseded in significance by government austerity measures. 
The paper thus offers an empirically informed study of contemporary mediatized 
environmental communication (and conflict) as a product of the mutually constitutive, but 
often unpredictable, interactions between NGO-activism, media, industry and formal politics, 
which traverse the local, national and transnational to varying degrees (see Hutchins & 
Lester, 2015). 
 
The paper also raises the issue of “authoritarian environmentalism”. The People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) is a focus of debates on the relative merits of “democratic versus 
authoritarian environmentalism” because of its growing number of environmental 
organizations and comparatively rapid advances in legislation on environmental protection 
(Eaton & Kostka, 2014; Gilley, 2012). China’s system of one-party rule has enabled the 
Party-state to ignore many pressing environmental issues and ensured that Chinese 
environmental organizations typically complement state goals of tackling (in politically non-
confronting ways) the environmental degradation that has accompanied rapid economic 
growth (Ho & Edmonds, 2012; Shapiro, 2012). However, the Party-state also has the 
perceived capacity to implement significant environmental protection policies quickly 
because, unlike in western democracies, it does not have to cater to the interests of high-
consuming citizens as voters, and can arguably override the interests of business groups that 
might be opposed to environmental action (Gilley, 2012, p. 288). This capacity is 
inadvertently highlighted by changing patterns of shark fin consumption associated with the 
recent introduction of government austerity measures in the PRC. 
 
I conclude that translocal celebrity environmental activism in mainland China has missed its 
target, being heavily influenced by communication strategies used in international campaigns 
and providing incoherent local framing. In particular, efforts to reduce shark-fin consumption 
through changing individual discretionary behaviour overlook the considerable consumption 
associated with official largesse. Declining demand for shark fin associated with government 
austerity measures demonstrates claims that broader efforts to reduce corruption may have 
greater potential to influence patterns of luxury food consumption in China than 
environmental communication campaigns (Fabinyi, 2011, p. 89). 
 
China’s celebrities and shark protection 
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Environmental communication mediated through celebrities and corporate elites is an 
established, albeit controversial, practice in western societies (Boykoff & Goodman, 2009). 
Supporters argue that leveraging “fame” helps to raise public awareness of environmental 
issues and organizations by generating media publicity, demystifying campaign issues, and 
attracting new audiences and sponsorship (United Nations Environmental Programme, n.d.). 
Critics contend that mediatized celebrity-corporate activism refers to an elitist mode of social 
control that depoliticizes environmental issues by presenting non-experts delivering 
simplified messages as authoritative voices for complex issues, turning environmentalism 
into a fashion or fad, and sometimes encouraging the ongoing exploitation of the natural 
world through the consumption of cause-related products (Brockington, 2009; Goodman, 
2013). 
 
These arguments have reduced explanatory capacity in the PRC– an emerging authoritarian 
superpower with a history of (failed) socialist experimentation, and recent rapid economic 
growth and social change. China’s private entrepreneurs and celebrities do not comprise an 
established “power elite” as in western societies, that is, a networked group of non-elected, 
“non-state” actors who influence national and increasingly international government 
decision-making. Members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in positions of 
institutional authority comprised the only identifiable elite group in mainland China until the 
mid-1990s. After the PRC’s founding in 1949, revolutionary politics ensured that imperial- 
and Republican-era elite groups – rural gentry, urban capitalists and opposition political, 
military, religious and cultural figures – ceased to exist as significant agents of governance, 
drivers of economic enterprise, and formers of local opinion and values (Hassid & Jeffreys, 
2015, p. 81). Throughout the Mao era (1949–1976), curtailment of the monetary economy, 
nationalization of industry and agrarian land redistribution, prevented private enterprise and 
significant private wealth accumulation. Party control of the state-owned media also ensured 
that China’s media chiefly communicated Party-state ideology and policies, and promoted 
revolutionary heroes and political figures as role models. A stratum of newly rich private 
entrepreneurs and entertainment celebrities has emerged along with the PRC’s post-1978 
policy of partially privatizing the economy and “opening up to the rest of the world”, which 
gained momentum in the 1990s, and development of a semi-commercialized media (Hassid 
& Jeffreys, 2015, p. 82). While China’s financial and cultural elites have limited political 
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power, they sometimes influence public policy debates (Jeffreys, 2016), as illustrated by 
shark-protection campaigns. 
 
The most prominent celebrity spokesperson for shark conservation in both the USA and 
mainland China is Yao Ming, the Shanghai-born owner of the Chinese Basketball 
Association’s Shanghai Sharks, and a retired star player with the American National 
Basketball Association (NBA). Yao appeals to multiple constituencies as a translocal 
celebrity. Ranked by Forbes Magazine as mainland China’s richest celebrity for six 
consecutive years between 2004 and 2009 (Yu, 2009), the Washington Times once claimed 
that: “The Yao craze knows no limits to time, geography or media” (Oates & Polumbaum, 
2004, p. 208). 
 
Yao Ming is the celebrity face of a series of spectacular Public Service Advertisements 
(PSAs) produced by WildAid that aim to encourage individuals to become ethical consumers 
and save the world’s oceans by refusing to eat shark-fin soup. Yao features in short, visually 
stunning videos that conclude with the message: “When the buying stops, the killing can 
too”. The PSAs’ narratives adopt some key principles of coherent framing – tell a story that 
“rouses emotions” and don’t repeat any counter arguments (Lakoff, 2010, p. 79). They imply 
that shark fin is the main reason for fishing sharks (which may not be the case), and that 
finning is the normal way of fishing sharks. They also use the highest figure provided by 
fisheries scientist Shelley Clarke (n.d.), who estimates that between 26–73 million sharks are 
killed each year, while ignoring her comment that: “no one knows how many sharks are 
killed for their fins, how many have their carcasses dumped at sea, or how many sharks are 
alive when finned”. 
 
Yao Ming’s activism dates back to August 2006 when WildAid launched a series of PSAs in 
China promoting protection of endangered species, before the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games 
(China’s elites and WildAid, 2006). In 2006, Yao Ming signed a WildAid pledge not to eat 
shark fin, and declared to a press conference in 2007 that shark-fin soup would not be served 
at his wedding banquet (Timeline for shark protection efforts, 2011). Yao Ming, Li Ning 
(gymnast and sportswear tycoon) and Liu Huan (musician) also featured in conservation 
messages that were shown on the state-run China Central Television Station and cable 
networks such as National Geographic (Yao Ming, Li Ning, Liu Huan, deng, 2006). These 
messages were further disseminated through state-owned advertising outlets, such as: taxi and 
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inflight video monitors; video billboards at airports and shopping centres; and printed 
advertisements on subway station walls and bus stops (WildAid 2010 Annual Report, 2011, 
p. 12). In fact, WildAid (n.d.) claims to have leveraged around USD 100 million per year in 
pro-bono media placement via state and private media partnerships in China to provide 
environmental communication. 
 
Three female Olympic divers – Guo Jingjing, Li Ting and Zhou Jihong – were among the 
first group of mainland Chinese sporting celebrities to feature in WildAid shark conservation 
PSAs. The divers appeared in separate PSAs produced in English and Chinese, delivering the 
collective message that: (a) sharks play an essential role in the ocean ecosystem and we have 
to protect them; (b) millions of sharks are killed each year because offering shark-fin soup at 
Chinese banquets honours the host and guests, or gives them “face”; (c) shark populations are 
being wiped out as a result; and (d) China and the Chinese people will “lose face” when that 
happens, so “don’t eat shark fin soup!” (Guo Jingjing, 2010; Li Ting: Blink, 2010; Zhou 
Jihong: Duty, 2010). The PSAs conclude with the WildAid tagline: “When the buying stops, 
the killing can too”. They therefore combine activist messaging with appeals to national 
pride, suggesting through reference to Olympian sports stars that China’s international 
reputation is more important than the forms of sociability associated with the eating of 
imperial cuisine. The PSAs arguably also offer an example of incoherent framing by 
triggering the notion that eating shark-fin soup is an important Chinese custom that “gives 
face” to individual hosts and guests in more localized contexts. 
 
Similar incoherence is present in the first WildAid PSA featuring Yao Ming as a solo 
spokesperson. It is framed by banquet behaviour, being distributed just before the 2010 
Chinese New Year and set in an upscale restaurant with a wall-to-wall aquarium. The Lunar 
New Year is China’s most important holiday and is typically celebrated by hosting large 
banquets for family and friends. The PSA begins with the statement: “What if you could see 
how shark-fin soup is made?” It opens with interior images of the restaurant. As a waiter 
carries covered bowls of soup to put on a table, the viewer sees blood gushing from the cut-
off fins of a still-alive shark lying at the bottom of the aquarium (Shipin: Yao Ming, n.d.; Yao 
Ming – shark fin soup, 2009). That graphic footage is allegedly real footage of “a live tawny 
nurse shark dumped on an Indonesian reef with its fins removed to supply the soup trade” 
(Yao Ming saves the sharks!!, 2009). An anonymous narrator says: “If you could see how 
each year up to 70 million sharks are killed to end up in soup, could you still eat it?” The 
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camera pans to shots of ethnically Chinese diners looking at the bleeding shark. Yao Ming 
pushes away the bowl of soup in front of him. The anonymous narrator states: “A third of all 
shark species are nearly extinct but we can help save them”. As other diners begin to push 
away their bowls, Yao Ming concludes by speaking the WildAid tagline: “Remember when 
the buying stops, the killing can too” (Yao Ming – shark fin soup, 2009). 
 
This spectacular PSA offers an example of incoherent framing in mainland Chinese settings. 
It activates “conventional habits” by framing the event as social banquet, but assumes that 
empathy with an edible animal naturally supersedes the social relations between host and 
guest. It ignores the possibility that pushing away the soup might imply an insult to the host, 
and hence may not only be a difficult action to perform, but also may have negative 
consequences in terms of continued family and/or work relationships. This incoherence is 
compounded by the inconsistency of the tagline (which equates “buying” to “killing”) with 
the spectacle (which more contentiously equates “accepting hospitality” to “killing”). 
 
The second WildAid PSA featuring Yao Ming as a solo spokesperson was released in late 
September 2011, following a publicized corporate banquet in Shanghai hosted by Yao Ming 
and British tycoon, Richard Branson (Save our sharks in Shanghai, 2011). The PSA, titled 
“The Price of Shark Fin Soup”, opens with an image of Yao Ming looking over the San 
Francisco Bay, admiring the blue water and sky. Yao Ming states: “What is the price of shark 
fin soup? If we keep killing tens of millions of sharks each year just for soup, it will change 
life in our oceans forever”. The camera then pans to an apocalyptic shot of a dry landlocked 
basin that has replaced the saltwater bay. Yao continues: “Is this the world we want to leave 
our children? Together we can save the oceans. Let’s keep sharks in our oceans, not in our 
soup”. The camera pans to a shot of Yao Ming and a group of children in front of a sunny 
San Francisco Bay. He concludes by speaking the WildAid tagline, reminding viewers that 
ethical consumerism can save the world for future generations (Yao Ming – the price of shark 
fin soup, 2011). Again, the attention-getting spectacularism of this PSA potentially 
undermines the coherence of its environmental message, as there is no evident connection 
between eating shark fin and “dried-up” oceans. 
 
The preference for the spectacular over other possible, more appropriate visuals and localized 
framing, perhaps explains why WildAid’s shark conservation program has been more 
successful with international and Anglophone audiences than it has in China. WildAid claims 
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that the Yao Ming Shark-fin Soup PSA obtained significant media coverage for the 
organization and its causes, reaching an audience of over 1 billion viewers across China and 
generating over 100 media stories throughout the world (WildAid 2010 Annual Report, 2011, 
pp. 10–12). However, a search for the Chinese-language keywords “Yao Ming” (姚明) and 
“shark fin” (鱼翅) on the China Core Newspaper Full-text Database of the China Knowledge 
Resource Integrated Database (CNKI), a database of around 700 Chinese newspapers since 
2000, obtained only 33 results for the nine years between 1 January 2006 and 31 December 
2014 (cnki.net, 5 March 2015). Not a great record of interest. English-language reporters 
initially proclaimed that “the media snub in China” was predictable; Yao’s attack on Chinese 
culture being considered a “step too far” in a country “where outside interference is strictly 
resisted by the communist government” (Even Yao Ming is sidelined, 2006). 
 
The media response to WildAid’s shark-protection program was much better overseas. 
Journalists cite Yao Ming’s involvement with WildAid as contributing to the introduction, in 
2011, of controversial bans on the sale, consumption and possession, of shark fins in the USA 
state of California, and the Canadian city of Toronto – areas with a high proportion of 
ethnically Chinese residents (Lin, 2011; Rogers, 2013). Hailed as a victory against a “savage, 
barbaric practice” by pro-shark protection local politicians and conservation groups (Rider, 
2013), both bans faced court challenges as intrusive and discriminatory, for singling out a 
Chinese custom, rather than banning all shark products, and potentially giving authorities the 
power to enter homes on suspicion the soup was being served (Rider, 2013; Rogers, 2013). 
Although the Toronto ban was overturned, the Californian ban came into effect on 1 July 
2013 (Rogers, 2013). The European Union also agreed to ban shark finning on all vessels in 
EU waters and all EU registered vessels around the world on 6 June 2013 (Sullivan, 2013). 
 
Contradicting earlier reservations about Chinese political censorship, a 2013 story in The 
Guardian claims instead that Yao Ming, as an “NBA giant”, has ruined “small Chinese fish 
factories” by persuading Chinese youth to reject shark-fin dishes (Thibault, 2013). The article 
cites the owners of two shark processing factories as saying: “Society is turning against us … 
because of all these articles in the press”, “business is no longer good” because young people 
won’t eat shark-fin dishes (Thibault, 2013). One owner laments: “Our industry is pretty small 
and Yao Ming is highly respected, so the government doesn’t support us” (Thibault, 2013). 
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These media-solicited claims imply the existence of defensive industry spokespersons 
attempting to counter the negative effects on industry of a successful activist campaign. 
 
However, it is questionable whether Yao Ming’s advocacy has led to a major decrease in 
sales of shark fin in mainland China, given the limited nature of broadcast media reportage it 
attracted. The dissemination of WildAid’s campaign through social media may be helping to 
dissuade young adults in China from eating shark-fin dishes, but this assertion is hard to 
verify. As detailed below, it is more probable that any decline in sales of shark fin is 
attributable to either the efforts of Chinese business elites advocating for anti-shark fin 
legislation in 2012, or the PRC Government’s introduction of austerity measures in 
December 2012. 
 
China’s entrepreneurs and shark protection 
 
Apart from leveraging Yao Ming’s fame, WildAid has mobilized an impressive array of 
business networks to garner support for its China-based shark conservation program. This has 
involved leveraging state and private media partnerships to obtain pro-bono media placement 
for environmental communication (WildAid n.d.), and obtaining support from other 
international NGOs, Chinese non-profits and prominent business figures. While opening the 
space for regulations that have dramatically curtailed the demand for shark fin in China, these 
efforts also attracted limited popular support. 
 
In July 2012, WildAid premiered a Chinese-language shark-protection PSA featuring some of 
the PRC’s most influential business leaders (Shipin: Yesheng jiuyuan, 2012). The 36-second-
long video stars five CEOs: Li Dongsheng (TCL Corporation); Huang Nubo (Beijing 
Zhongkun Investment Group); Feng Lun (Beijing Vantone Real Estate); Hu Baosen (Jianye 
Real Estate); and Wei Xue (China Public Relations and Consultants). Li Dongsheng is the 
CEO of a state-owned multinational; the other four people are founders of private companies. 
All of these people are involved with corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives, 
including environmental protection (corporate philanthropy has been more or less mandated 
by central government policies since the mid-2000s) (Zu, 2009). Huang Nubo is Chair of the 
WildAid China Board and a Councillor for The Nature Conservancy (TNC), a US-based 
international NGO dedicated to land and marine conservation. Feng Lun is founder of the 
China Urban Realty Association (CURA), an affiliation of local real estate companies 
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established in 1999 with a CSR focus on the environment (Consultants, 2007). Feng Lun and 
Hu Baosen are members of the Alxa SEE Ecological Association (SEE), a CSR organization 
founded by nearly 100 entrepreneurs in 2004 (Charter members of SEE, 2004). Wei Xue is 
the wife of Li Dongsheng and Chair of the TCL Charity Foundation, which was established 
in 2012 to support the government welfare goals of poverty alleviation and disaster relief 
(Wei Xue, n.d.). 
 
The PSA engages coherent framing by linking environmental protection with issues of global 
risk and national pride, while arguably using the “wrong messengers” (Lakoff, 2010, p. 80). 
Business leaders are aspirational role models in the PRC, but “resentment” and “distrust” of 
the newly rich is common (Fabinyi, 2011, p. 88). The PSA opens with the five CEOs sitting 
around a dining table, and asks: “When these business leaders come together, what do they 
talk about?” “We must plan for the future”, says Li Dongsheng; “We must protect our assets”, 
says Hu Baosen; “We must think globally and act locally”, says Huang Nubo; “We must 
make the world proud of China”, says Wei Xue. “We must protect our oceans by not eating 
shark fin”, says Feng Lun (Shipin: Yesheng jiuyuan, 2012). The PSA concludes with the 
WildAid tagline, implying that those Chinese people who seek to be financially successful, 
patriotic, cosmopolitan, and acclaimed, are forward-thinking and not tradition-bound; they 
can save the world’s oceans by choosing not to eat a dish once prepared for emperors. 
 
The four men in the PSA are also members of the China Entrepreneur Club (CEC), which has 
advocated for shark conservation in China alongside WildAid and TNC since the late 2000s. 
These connections highlight the recent emergence in China of translocal networks of elites 
aiming to mobilize human, institutional, material, and discursive resources into networks of 
action focused on the environment. Established in 2006, the CEC is a non-profit organization 
and elite social club that aims to provide a platform for “Chinese entrepreneurial exchange” 
and “international collaboration”, and to promote “sustainable economic and social 
development” (About us, 2007). In 2008, the CEC and China’s Ocean University released a 
“shark fin nutrition report” stating that shark fin contains high levels of lead and mercury and 
has no nutritional or medicinal value (“Baohu shayu juchi yuchi”, 2009). In January 2009, 
Zhang Xingsheng, a CEC member and Director of the North Asia region of TNC, started a 
conversation on China’s Twitter-like Weibo, calling on the PRC’s legislature to ban shark fin 
consumption. Zhang has over 1.6 million Weibo followers, but the shark conversation 
attracted less than 330 responses (Zhang, 2011). 
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On 22 April 2009, the CEC celebrated the fortieth anniversary of Earth Day by launching a 
“Protect Sharks: Don’t Eat Shark Fin” initiative, in conjunction with WildAid, CURA and 
SEE (Shu baiming qiyejia xiangying, 2009). CEC members signed a pledge stating: “I won’t 
eat shark fin and I won’t invite others to eat shark fin; I won’t accept gifts of shark fin and I 
won’t give shark fin as a gift to others”. Calls to log in a pledge were posted on a dedicated 
website titled ‘Stop: No Shark-fin Buying, No Sharks Killing’ (2009), receiving over 2,400 
responses. Celebrity CEOs such as Wang Shi (2009) posted “Don’t Eat Shark Fin” messages 
on their blogs – over 31 million people read Wang’s blog, although his shark thread attracted 
less than 150 posts. 
 
Also with the support of the CEC, a range of shark-protection activities were rolled out in 
different cities across the PRC between late 2011 and early 2013, with the slogan: “Create 
Zero-Shark-Fin Cities: Don’t Eat in Shark-Fin Restaurants”. On 22 December 2011, Tencent 
(China’s largest Internet service portal), together with the Green Beagle Environment 
Institute, a Beijing-based NGO (www.bjep.org.cn/), launched a “No Shark-Fin Soup for 2012 
New Year’s Banquets” initiative. Green Beagle is headed by Wang Xue, who heads another 
NGO called Zero Shark Fin (www.zero.ngo.cn). Press releases indicate that the launch was 
supported by over 100 organizations, including the CEC and TNC (Bai jia jigou zai Beijing, 
2011). Hotels and restaurants that committed to the “Zero Shark Fin” policy were rewarded 
with a commemorative plaque to hang in their premises stating that they are ‘shark-fin free’ 
(Beijing Jindingxuan guapai “ling yuchi”, 2012). Tencent created a dedicated website to 
support the initiative titled “Don’t Eat Shark Fin”, which lists affiliated organizations and 
relevant news, and features the WildAid tagline, but appears to have attracted limited traffic 
to date (Juchi yuchi, n.d.). Only 1,600 people had clicked the ‘I promise not to eat shark fin’ 
pledge as of March 2015 (and the link is no longer active). 
 
The “No Shark-Fin Soup for 2012 New Year’s Banquets” initiative was supported by some 
local elites. Shangguan Junle, the owner of a Shanxi Province restaurant chain, declared in 
late 2011 that he would neither eat shark fin nor provide shark-fin dishes in his restaurants 
once his existing stocks were depleted, even though shark fin accounted for a third of his 
company’s annual turnover (Restaurant serves dish of controversy, 2012). Shangguan 
received a “Shark-Fin Free” plaque for his efforts and is listed as a supporter on the Zero 
Shark Fin website (Chengnuo jujue yuchi de qiyejia, 2013). Shangguan also attracted 
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controversy by announcing that patrons at his restaurants on the first day of the Chinese New 
Year holidays, 3 January 2012, would receive free shark-fin dishes until his stocks were gone. 
Some netizens described Shangguan as an admirable role model, while others accused him of 
engaging in a promotional stunt (Shangguan Junle jiesuo “gaodiao cishan”, 2012). Whichever 
the case may be, Shangguan posted a message on 9 January 2012 on Tencent’s QQ, an online 
instant messaging service, calling on people to stop eating shark fin to protect the 
environment and their health, which was read by around 11,000 people (Shangguan, 2012). 
 
Other local elites committed resources to the rollout of “Zero Shark Fin” initiatives in 
different cities across China in 2012. Green Beagle, Tencent, the CEC, and SEE, organized a 
petition, which was signed by more than 100 organizations, urging the Shenzhen Municipal 
Government to ban the sale of shark fin, and make Shenzhen China’s first “Shark-Fin Free 
City” (Yang, 2012). The petition stated that a ban would send an important message about 
China’s commitment to environmental protection, given Shenzhen’s proximity to Hong Kong 
– the major market for shark fin. In Changsha, the Head of the Hunan Food Industry told 
journalists that a ban was not relevant because the city had a limited market for shark fin. 
However, some restaurateurs had indicated that they would follow Yao Ming and the CEC’s 
lead (Yao & Shu, 2012). In Zhanjiang, posts were placed on blogs, by individuals describing 
themselves as junior high-school students, calling for volunteers to hand out shark-protection 
leaflets in shopping malls (Szyhippo, 2013). 
 
Although these initiatives involved action at an unambiguously influential level, they failed 
to generate visible support. An interview with Wang Xue posted on Ynet.com in February 
2013 suggested that city-based “Zero Shark Fin” initiatives were implemented because the 
“No Shark-Fin Soup for 2012 New Year’s Banquets” initiative was unsuccessful. Tencent 
and Green Beagle were unable to attract large-scale support from major restaurants. A 
follow-up survey showed that “only 17 of 249 luxury hotels in Beijing, Shenzhen and 
Fuzhou” had stopped offering shark-fin dishes (Qin, 2013). Support chiefly came from 
multinational hotel chains, and domestic restaurant chains with international aspirations, that 
had already committed to supporting WildAid and a “No Shark Fin” policy, such as the Hong 
Kong-based Peninsular hotels chain and the South Beauty restaurant chain (80hou Wang Xue, 
2013; see Figure 1 below). The “Zero Shark Fin” organizers subsequently launched 
initiatives in individual cities, attempting to attract popular support from volunteers, working 
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on the assumption that 1,000 volunteers in each city would translate into broader action 
through social media networks. These efforts also met with limited success. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE 
Figure 1: When the Buying Stops, the Killing Stops (Notice informing patrons of South 
Beauty that the restaurant chain will not provide shark fin dishes and products from 1 
September 2011, and asking for their understanding and support) 
 
The failure of these efforts to attract visible support suggests that the environmental 
communication was fronted by the “wrong messengers” (Lakoff, 2010, p. 80). This 
conclusion is partly confirmed by responses to a youth-focused campaign called “I’m 
Finished With Fins”, which WildAid launched in China in September 2013 with the support 
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of the five celebrity hosts of Happy Camp, a hugely popular family variety show. The 
associated PSA on Youku, a Chinese version of Youtube, has attracted more than 83,000 
views and multiple posts on other social media totalling over 360,000 views (Cheng, 2013; 
Shipin: Kuailejiazu wo yu yuchi, n.d.). Many of these posts reiterate WildAid’s celebrity-
endorsed narratives that “shark finning is brutal” and “eating shark fin is unhealthy”. 
However, others accuse the hosts of being “hypocritical” and “self-promoting” because “only 
rich people can eat such things”. Yet others suggest that environmental communication 
should be located in government departments rather than targeting sites used by “ordinary 
citizens” (Spring-shine, 2013). 
 
However, WildAid’s leveraging of Chinese business figures succeeded where it might have 
been most expected to fail: it brought the issue of shark fin consumption to the attention of 
the 2012 meeting of the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s so-called “rubber stamp” 
legislature (Truex, 2014). The full congress of nearly 3,000 Party-selected but publicly 
“elected” members meets for around two weeks every year to vote through bills, the major 
content of which has already been decided by government departments and Party committee. 
While members are expected to submit motions on alternative policies and increasingly do 
so, such motions seldom become policy (Jeffreys, 2016). 
 
In March 2012, Ding Liguo, a member of the CEC and SEE, submitted a motion to the NPC, 
which was drafted with the help of Zhang Xingsheng from TNC, recommending that relevant 
government departments set an international example of good practice by banning shark-fin 
soup at state-funded banquets (Yuan, 2012). Ding Liguo, ranked among the richest people in 
China in 2008, is the Chair of Delong Steel, a private company in Hebei Province (The 400 
richest Chinese, 2008). He was a member for Hebei at the Eleventh NPC (2008–2012). An 
official reply from the administrative office of the State Council dated 16 June 2012 stated 
that legislation banning shark-fin dishes at state-funded banquets would result by 2015 (Yuan, 
2012). 
 
On 8 December 2013, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State 
Council issued the Regulations on Domestic Official Hospitality for Party and Government 
Organs (Zhonggongzhongyangbangongting, 2013). Article 9 of the Regulations states that: 
“Official dinners should not involve: high-end cuisine or dishes that contain shark fin, bird’s 
 16 
nest, or any protected animal; cigarettes and premium drinks; the use of private clubs; and 
high consumption costs”. 
 
The sale of shark fin has since reportedly plummeted in China. A survey conducted by the 
PRC’s Ministry of Commerce during Chinese New Year holidays in 2013 indicated that sales 
of shark fin were down by 70 per cent (Extravagant dining curbed by frugality call, 2013). A 
survey conducted by WildAid (n.d.) in late 2013 suggests that demand for shark fin had 
dropped on average by 82 per cent in Guangzhou – the major trade centre for shark fin in 
mainland China. Reports by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) indicate that the shark fin trade 
from Hong Kong to China dropped almost 90 per cent in that same year (Kao, 2014). 
 
While WildAid (n.d.), the CEC and the WWF, attribute this drop to the success of their 
environmental communication and only secondarily or possibly to the government ban (Kao, 
2014; Jin shi yuchi, 2012; Yuan, 2012), the available evidence suggests otherwise. As Lakoff 
(2010, p. 77) laments, environmental action tends to focus on individual behavioural change 
rather than political action, when “[to] an enormous degree, governmental action outweighs 
and shapes individual actions”. In this instance, the dramatic decline in demand for shark fin 
is attributable to government action that has only tangential links to environmental 
communication and authoritarian environmentalism. 
 
Government austerity and shark protection 
 
The cause of shark conservation in mainland China was unexpectedly boosted in December 
2012 when incoming President Xi Jinping introduced eight provisions designed to reduce 
governmental corruption and improve the work habits of government employees 
(Zhonggongzhongyangzhengzhiju zhaokai huiyi, 2012). The eighth provision, advocating 
austerity measures to curb extravagant spending, has led to a dramatic reduction in luxury 
goods consumption in China. According to the Ministry of Commerce, a survey assessing the 
effects of austerity measures over the Chinese New Year in 2013 showed that revenues in 
high-end restaurants in certain cities had fallen by between 20 and 35 per cent when 
compared to those for the preceding year (Extravagant dining curbed, 2013). Sales of shark 
fin were down by 70 per cent and sales of birds’ nests and abalone were down by 40 per cent. 
Other media reports indicate that the austerity measures have reduced demand for imported 
goods such as Australian wine (Greenblat, 2014) and altered luxury consumption and 
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business practices across the country. For example, in March 2013, the Emperor Shark Fin 
Restaurant in Jinan City changed its name and cut the number of luxury items on its menu, 
while increasing its standard-priced dishes, to attract patronage and compensate for reduced 
custom from local government officials (Li, 2013). Taxi drivers in Dunhuang, a “silk road” 
tourism destination, told the author of this paper that the city’s luxury hotel, restaurant and 
wine business had declined along with reduced custom from government officials attending 
“conferences”. But “farmhouse accommodations” providing “local food and beer” were 
booming as government officials altered their expectations and spending patterns to conform 
to government policy (Personal conversations, September 2013). 
 
These changes have been widely publicized in China’s media. A search for the keywords 
“shark fin” (鱼翅) and “austerity” (勤俭节约) on CNKI obtained 74 hits for the two-year 
period between 1 January 2013 and 31 December 2014 (cnki.net, 4 February 2015). This 
figure points to the publicity success of the government action when compared to NGO 
action, being more than double the number of mentions that “Yao Ming” and “shark fin” 
obtained in nine years. 
 
While government spokespersons now claim that the austerity measures are helping to 
support sustainable consumption and protect the environment (Extravagant dining curbed, 
2013), the motivation for introducing the Regulations on Domestic Official Hospitality was 
political survival rather than environmentalism. The Xi Jinping–Li Keqiang administration’s 
austerity measures followed earlier, less focused support for reducing official extravagance 
under the Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao administration (2002–2012). Hu Jintao stated at a 
Communist Party Congress in 2007 that preventing corruption was important because 
corruption diminished popular support for the Party and threatened its survival (Delegates 
acclaim CPC’s determination in curbing corruption, 2007). Although the Hu–Wen 
administration focused on individual acts of large-scale graft and bribery, the spending of 
public funds on lavish dining and entertainment is a long-standing focus of public 
condemnation in China (Buneng jiemi de “gongkuan chihe 3000 yi”, 2012). Indeed, it is 
probable that the State Council agreed to consider Ding Liguo’s proposal to ban shark-fin 
dishes at state banquets because the central government had already committed to the 
austerity measures. These measures are, needless to say, disliked by civil servants and 





While inadvertently highlighting the potential of authoritarian environmentalism, the success 
of government austerity measures relative to NGO-led shark-protection initiatives may be 
explained by the different sources of demand for shark-fin dishes in mainland China – 
government officials versus private individuals. NGO-led and celebrity-endorsed initiatives 
followed an international social-activism campaign and communication model of moral 
persuasion by role models. Their message was framed in terms of changing individual 
discretionary behaviour, especially that of young affluent Chinese whose tastes have moved 
towards conspicuous consumption. Shark-protection campaigns clearly have the capacity to 
alter individual consumption patterns, as evidenced by Yao Ming’s success in North America 
with ethnically Chinese people. The authority of the celebrity endorsement may also be 
persuading young adults in China that eating shark-fin soup is bad for the environment. But 
the PSAs’ evocation of banqueting and associated social relations arguably involves 
incoherent framing in the mainland Chinese context insofar as it misrepresents the choices 
available, culturally, to recipients of hospitality. Shark-fin consumption in China is rarely 
framed at an individual level; and, the main purchasers of shark-fin products are older than 
the target audience of celebrity-endorsed environmental campaigns, being the parents of 
young adults who are getting married and having expensive celebratory banquets, or people 
with sufficient access to organizational resources to afford prestige-giving banquets. More 
generally, the framing may lack effectiveness because the majority of young adults in 
mainland China have never seen an ocean, and are unlikely to purchase an expensive item 
such as shark fin in the first place. 
 
In contrast, the austerity measures directly affect the behaviour of government elites whose 
luxury consumption is driven by the need to build intra-government, intra-Party and business 
relationships to achieve personal success, and by the availability of public funds. Unlike the 
WildAid efforts, these messages had an almost instant effect. The explicit (and credible) 
threat of being publicly exposed and punished for failing to constrain acts of conspicuous 
consumption has proved far more effective than NGO-led efforts in moral persuasion 
targeting affluent young adults. This success demonstrates that efforts to reduce corruption 
have greater capacity to influence patterns of luxury food consumption in China than 
environmental communication campaigns. 
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Despite their comparative failure, celebrity-endorsed shark conservation campaigns highlight 
the potential for environmental NGOs and elite syndicates to effect social change in China. 
These latter organizations managed to persuade national and local elites to rollout shark-
protection campaigns across multiple cities. The scale of that enterprise shows how NGO- 
and elite-led communicative activism can be self-reinforcing, leading one group of 
organizations and elites to inspire other groups to undertake similar activities, regardless of 
national boundaries. This suggests that celebrity and corporate activism could possibly be a 
significant force for social change in China, given the limited spaces available for broader 
political participation in that country. Such activism may ensure that financial and cultural 
elites do not resurrect the demand for shark fin by providing it at corporate-funded dinners to 
court “favours” from government officials. However, in order for international environmental 
activism to be more significantly successful, the use of spectacular communication practice 
based on “western” models clearly needs refining. It not only matters how we frame the 
environment and sharks, but also how we understand the environment of human action in 
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